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Abstract: In December 2005, media outlets reported the existence of
a secret government program aimed at tracking terrorist activity
through the use of telephone records. As part of that program, the
National Security Agency ("NSA") and Federal Bureau of Investigation("FBI") reportedly demanded that telephone companies turn over
confidential customer records to government agencies. The program,
commonly referred to as "data mining," involves scrutinizing trillions
of call records, searching for suspicious patterns of communication
between domestic phone numbers and those of suspected foreign
terrorists. Once a link between a suspected foreign terrorist and a
domestic telephone number is found, records of calls originating from
that number are examined. The records of recipients of those calls are
then examined for signs of communication with suspected terrorists.
Due to the extreme secrecy of the program, both its legality and its
statutory basis remain unclear.
This article examines the various statutory schemes under
which the NSA and FBI data mining program may have been
conducted. It begns by summarizing the process of data mining and
analyzing its usefulness as a counter-terrorism tool. It then discusses
the general statutory prohibition on telephone companies revealing
customer records and the statutory exceptions to that ban. The article
then addresses the incentives faced by phone companies under the
current statutory scheme and the resulting impact on consumer
privacy expectations. Under federal law, telephone companies that
reveal customer records pursuant to national security requests by the
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NSA, FBI, and other agencies are insulated from the liability based on
those revelations. That insulation from liability, coupled with the
threat of adverse government action, creates an overwhelming
incentive for telephone companies to disclose records when served
with a request. This article concludes by arguing that data mining
leads to a large number of false positive identifications of potential
terrorists which, in turn, must be discredited using more traditional
law enforcement techniques. Due to the time and manpower required
to track down those false positive identifications, this article concludes
that data mining is an inefficient use of the government's limited
resources, and recommends traditional law enforcement techniques
as a more effective means of pursuing the domestic portion of the
"War on Terror."
2008] KRENME
I. INTRODUCTION: DATA MINING AND TELEPHONE RECORDS
In December 2005, media outlets exposed the existence of a secret
government program aimed at tracking and preventing terrorist
activity.' According to reports, the program involved demands by the
National Security Agency ("NSA") and Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") that telephone companies disclose customer records.2 The
records demanded included details of who has called or been called by
a particular telephone user, how long the calls lasted, what time of day
they were made, and the number of times calls were made to or
received from any other phone number.3
The type of counter-terrorism program for which the records were
reportedly requested is known as "data mining." 4 Data mining
involves scrutinizing trillions of call records in a search for patterns of
communication between domestic phone numbers and those of
suspected foreign terrorists.5 Once a link between a suspected foreign
terrorist and a domestic telephone number is found, records of calls
originating from the domestic number are examined.6 Recipients of
those calls are then examined for signs of communication with
suspected terrorists. 7 Factors such as time, duration, origin,
destination, frequency, and quantity of calls are weighed in an attempt
' See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Domestic Surveillance: The Program; Spy
Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at AI.
2 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note i, at Al; Lowell Bergman et al., Domestic
Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at Al; Congress Demands NSA Spying Answers, CBS NEWS, May 11,
2o06 ,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2o6/o5/ll/politics/mainl6O9 261.shtml.
3 Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al.
4 Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al; see also American Civil Liberties Union,
Eavesdropping lol: What Can the NSA Do? Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/23989res2oo6o 1 31 .html.
s Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al.
6 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note I, at Al; American Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 4.
7 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note i, at Al; American Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 4.
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to discover suspicious patterns of communication. 8 If analysis of the
calls shows a pattern of communication between suspected terrorists
and a particular phone number, the NSA instructs the FBI to
investigate the individual to whom that number belongs.9
Data mining is unique because it does not involve the real-time
tracing of calls traditionally utilized by law enforcement in so-called
"pen register" or "trap and trace" programs. Under a pen register
program, a device is used to monitor a particular phone number and
decode outgoing electronic signals, thereby revealing which numbers
are dialed from that phone.10 Under a trap and trace program, a
device that decodes the electronic signals accompanying incoming
calls is used to monitor a particular phone number.11 Federal law
requires government entities to obtain a court order before using pen
registers or trap and trace devices to monitor the incoming or
outgoing calls from a suspect's telephone.12 Government agents may
8 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; American Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 4.
9 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Ai; American Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 4.
1o See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). Under that section, the term "pen register" is defined as
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,
provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents
of any communication, but such term does not include any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic
communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing,
for communications services provided by such provider or any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service
for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its
business.
n See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2001). Under that section, the term "trap and trace device" is
defined as
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing,
routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to
identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication.
1218 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2001).
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obtain a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123 to monitor phone traffic
between numbers within the geographic United States, pursuant to a
finding by the court that an "attorney for the Government has certified
to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."13
In order to use a pen register or trap and trace device to monitor
incoming or outgoing phone traffic between a phone number in the
United States and numbers in foreign countries, government agents
must obtain a court order from either a magistrate judge or the special
court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA").14 In contrast to the use of pen registers or trap and trace
devices, which require a court order and the installation of special
equipment, data mining involves obtaining and examining the records
of millions of individuals without installing any special monitoring
equipment or obtaining a court order.15
Data mining programs also differ from "wiretapping." Under
wiretap programs, the spoken contents of telephone conversations are
monitored or recorded. 16 "Contents" are defined under federal law as
"any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of [a]
communication." 17 The recent NSA and FBI disclosure requests
reportedly did not involve the monitoring of spoken content. 18
Rather, the requests were limited to records of electronically-
transmitted data about the origin, destination, duration, frequency,
and quantity of calls.29
1' 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2001).
14 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1861 (2006).
is See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Ai; American Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 4.
16 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979) (drawing the distinction between
intrusions which monitor the contents of communications and those that monitor only the
telephone numbers dialed or numbers from which a call was received).
1718 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2002).
18 See CBS NEWS, supra note 2 ("The program does not involve listening to or taping the
calls. Instead it documents who talks to whom in personal and business calls ... by
tracking which numbers are called."); Lichtblau and Risen, supra note i, at Ai ("The N.S.A.
has sought to analyze communications patterns to glean clues from details like who is
calling whom, how long a phone call lasts and what time of day it is made, and the origins
and destinations of phone calls.").
19 See CBS NEWS, supra note 2; Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al.
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The government's data mining program is an undesirable
development and should be discontinued. The program creates two
principal problems. First, it uses a little-known statutory scheme to
create perverse incentives for telephone companies to compromise the
privacy of their customers. Second, the program ineffectively utilizes
limited government resources by creating millions of false positive
suspects who must then be investigated and eliminated by traditional
law enforcement methods.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY OF TELEPHONE RECORDS
When served with NSA or FBI requests for records, phone
companies face the dilemma of whether to risk customer lawsuits by
disclosing the records, or to risk punitive action by refusing to comply
with the government's request. Federal law governing telephone
records attempts to balance the confidentiality interests of telephone
customers against the government's duty to assure national security.
In order to maintain that balance, the law prohibits
telecommunications providers from disclosing customer records
except in narrowly defined circumstances. The general prohibition on
disclosure is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2702 and 47 U.S.C. § 222.
Exceptions to that prohibition are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2703 and
18 U.S.C. § 2709.20
A. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSURE
OF CUSTOMER RECORDS:
18 U.S.C. § 2702
The general prohibition on disclosure of customer records is
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2702. It provides that "[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (b) or (c), a provider of... an electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other
2o The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act also allows limited access to telephone records
for the purposes of counter-terrorism investigations. See 50 U.S.C. § 186i(a)(i). This
article does not discuss FISA provisions governing disclosure of customer records by
telephone companies because a court order is required to compel disclosure under the
FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § i86i(b)(i) (requiring application to a magistrate judge or the special
court established by the FISA in order to obtain a court order demanding disclosure of
customer records). The recent requests for telephone records by the NSA and FBI
reportedly did not involve a court order. See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al;
Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Ai; CBS NEwS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties
Union, supra note 4.
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information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service
. . to any government entity."21 "Electronic communication" is
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510 as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system." 22 That definition encompasses electronic
impulses containing dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted or received when an outgoing call is made or
an incoming call is answered that are recorded by phone companies
for the purposes of billing or recordkeeping. 23 "Wire" and "oral"
communications, which include the spoken and auditory content of
telephone conversations, are specifically exempted from the definition
of "electronic communication." 24 The definition of "electronic
communication," therefore, arguably includes telephone records
showing that a call was made or received and billing records
pertaining to the duration, quantity, and frequency of such cans, but
does not include voice information exchanged by the parties to the
call.25
The exceptions to the general prohibition on disclosure of
customer records contained in subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 2702
pertain only to information about the content of communications.26
As such, those exceptions do not apply to the recent NSA and FBI
2118 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2006).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2002).
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (referring to "incoming electronic impulses" that "identify the
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information"
captured by so-called "trap and trace" devices); 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (referring to the
"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted" by outgoing calls and
stating that "such information shall not include the contents of any communication, but
such term does include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or
electronic communication service for billing, or recording as incident to billing"). See also
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.1 (describing a "pen register" as a device that "records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial
on the phone is released" and distinguishing the record of a call being made that is
generated by such electrical impulses from records of the spoken content of such a call).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(A) (2002).
25 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (discussing records generated by decoding electronic impulses
accompanying a phone call that are recorded by a pen register and distinguishing those
records from the spoken content of the call).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006).
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disclosure requests, which were limited to records of electronically-
transmitted data about the origin, destination, duration, frequency,
and quantity of calls.27 The exceptions to the general prohibition on
disclosure contained in subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 2702 allow
telecommunications providers to divulge customer records "as
otherwise authorized in section 2703." 28 That statute, and the
circumstances in which it authorizes the release of customer records,
is discussed in Section III.A, below.
B. THE PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER
PROPRIETARY NETWORK INFORMATION:
47 U.S.C. § 222
Records regarding the "type, destination, location, and amount of
use of a telecommunications service" that are obtained by a phone
company "solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship" are
defined under federal law as "customer proprietary network
information" ("CPNI).29 Under 47 U.S.C. § 222, CPNI may only be
disclosed "as required by law or with the approval of the customer."30
Therefore, the prohibition on disclosure of CPNI can be circumvented
by any other federal statute's authorization to divulge that
information.
III. STATUTES REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER RECORDS
Two principle statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 and 2709, require
telephone companies to turn customer records over to a government
entity when that entity serves the company with a specific type of
demand. Those laws present themselves in the form of narrow
exceptions to the general prohibition on disclosure of customer
records. Telephone companies are immune from liability for
disclosures made pursuant to those exceptions.
27 See CBS NEWS, supra note 2; Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al.
28 18 U.S.C. § 2702(C)(1) (2006).
29 47 U.S.C. § 222(h) (1999).
30 47 U.S.C. § 222(C)(1) (1999).
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A. THE WARRANT, COURT ORDER, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBPOENA EXCEPTIONS:
18 U.S.C. § 2703(C)
Telephone companies are required by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) to turn
over customer records to a government entity without customer
consent when (i) served with a warrant demanding disclosure, (2)
served with a court order demanding disclosure, (3) the government
entity submits a formal written request for records relating to
telemarketing fraud, or (4) pursuant to an administrative subpoena.31
The law requires phone companies to disclose information pertaining
to the customer's name, address, local and long distance connection
records (including call duration and frequency), the length of
subscription and type of service subscribed to, telephone number or
other information used to identify the subscriber, and payment
records (including credit card or bank account numbers).32
No law requires that the telephone customer whose records are
divulged to the government pursuant to a warrant, court order,
written request for records relating to telemarketer fraud, or
administrative subpoena, be informed that his or her records have
been disclosed. The government entity to whom the records are
revealed is under no obligation to provide notice of the disclosure.33
Telephone companies may be prohibited by the terms of an
administrative subpoena or court order from informing customers of
government demands for records, but 18 U.S.C. § 2703 itself contains
no clause prohibiting companies from informing customers of a
government request for records.34
Even if the initial request for disclosure is made without a warrant,
court order, or administrative subpoena, telephone companies are
required to retain requested records for ninety days while the
government entity making the request applies for an order or warrant,
or goes through the process of issuing an administrative subpoena.35
31 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006) (requiring disclosure when the company is served with a
warrant, court order, or formal request relating to telemarketing fraud), (C)(2) (requiring
disclosure "when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a
Federal or State statute").
32 §2703(C)(2).
33 § 2703(c)(3).
34 See generally § 2703.
3518 U.S.C. § 2703(t)(1) (2006).
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The ninety-day retention period is renewable on request by the
government entity.36 There is no limit on the number of times the
government may request renewal.37 The retention period does not
take effect, however, until a request for records is made.38 Nothing in
18 U.S.C. § 2703 prohibits telephone companies from disposing of
records before a disclosure request is made.39 Furthermore, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 does not require telephone companies to record any
information in addition to the records that they normally keep.4o
Telephone companies only maintain records of metered calls for
billing purposes. Records of non-metered calls are not kept, and
telephone companies are not required to create records of those calls
simply to comply with government disclosure requests.
Telephone companies that disclose customer records in
compliance with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2703 are granted
immunity from both criminal and civil liability arising out of the
disclosure.41 Therefore, companies cannot be held accountable by
their customers or other individuals whose records are disclosed to
the government pursuant to a warrant, court order, written request for
records relating to telemarketer fraud, or administrative subpoena.42
1. THE WARRANT EXCEPTION
Telephone companies are required to turn customer records over
to a government entity when served with a warrant demanding
disclosure. 43 In order for a government entity to obtain such a
warrant, it must establish "probable cause" by articulating "facts or
circumstances" sufficient to "warrant a man of reasonable caution in
36 § 2703(f(2).
37 Id.
38 See § 2703(f(1) (stating that "upon the request of a governmental entity," telephone
companies "shall take all necessary steps to preserve records").
39 See generally § 2703.
40 Id.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (2006).
42 Id.
43 § 2703(c)(1)(A).
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the belief" that a crime had been or was about to be committed.44 The
applicability of the warrant is limited to particular telephone records
that are demonstrated, with some degree of certainty, to be related to
the specific crime for which probable cause was shown.45
The recent NSA and FBI requests for telephone records reportedly
included records of millions of customers who were not suspected of
criminal activity.46 Those requests were reportedly made without a
warrant demanding telephone companies disclose the records.47 It is
unlikely, therefore, that the requests were made pursuant to the
warrant exception provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
2. THE COURT ORDER EXCEPTION
When served with a court order demanding disclosure, telephone
companies are required to disclose customer records to the
government entity making the request.48 In order to obtain a court
order, the government entity must articulate specific facts showing
that the records sought are relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation.49 Telephone companies have the option to file a motion
to quash or modify a court order requiring "unusually voluminous"
disclosures.50
44 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
45 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized").
46 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
47 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
48 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) ("[A] court order for disclosure under subsection. . . (c)
may be issued only by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe.., the records and other information sought are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.").
5o Id. ("[A] court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by
the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records
requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise
would cause an undue burden on such provider.").
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NSA and FBI counter-terrorism programs constitute ongoing
criminal investigations insofar as federal law criminalizes harboring,
providing support for, receiving training from, or conspiring with
suspected terrorists.1 The recent NSA and FBI requests for phone
records, however, were reportedly made without a court order
demanding telephone companies disclose the records.52 It is thus
unlikely that the requests were made pursuant to the court order
exception of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
3. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA EXCEPTION
Telephone companies are required by law to disclose customer
records to the government when served with an administrative
subpoena authorized by state or federal law.53 The United States
Supreme Court has long held that agencies have the power to issue
subpoenas to gain information as long as that information is not
"incompetent or irrelevant to [the agency] in the discharge of [its
duties]." 54 Investigatory subpoenas will be enforced when the
investigation at issue is congressionally authorized and is undertaken
for a purpose that Congress has the power to command.5 The Court
has explicitly held that probable cause need not be shown for an
administrative subpoena to issue.56 All that needs to be demonstrated
for an agency to overcome a challenge to its subpoena is that the
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated power by carrying on
an investigation, and that the information sought is relevant to that
investigation.57
51 See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2002); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(A), 2339(B), 2339(C), 2339(D)
(2006).
52 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
53 18 U.S.C. § 2703(C)(2) (2006).
54 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
55 Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
56 Id. (holding that "the requirement of 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,'
literally applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order for production,
by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a
purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.").
57 Id.
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The NSA and FBI are charged with investigating and preventing
international and domestic terrorism, and therefore have the power to
issue administrative subpoenas while investigating possible terrorist
plots.58 Media coverage of the recent requests for telephone records
made by those agencies, however, does not reveal whether the
requests were made pursuant to administrative subpoenas.59 Given
that the recent requests for telephone records were not made pursuant
to a court order or warrant,6° it is likely that they were made pursuant
to either the administrative subpoena exception provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(2), or the exception for FBI requests for records relevant to
ongoing investigations of terrorist activities provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709. The latter is discussed below.
B. FBI ACCESS TO TELEPHONE RECORDS RELEVANT TO
INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST AcTIVITIES:
18 U.S.C. § 2709
In addition to the requirement that telephone companies disclose
customer records pursuant to a warrant, court order, or
administrative subpoena, 18 U.S.C. § 2709 requires companies to turn
over subscriber information and billing records when those records
are demanded pursuant to a certification issued by the FBI that the
records are relevant to an ongoing counterterrorism investigation. 61
Under this provision, a certification may be made by the Director of
the FBI or any designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant
Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a
Bureau field office. 6 2 Since the FBI has 56 field offices, a total of 58
individuals could conceivably issue a certification under this
58 See National Security Agency, Introduction to NSA/CSS,
http://www.nsa.gov/about/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2oo8); Federal Bureau of
Investigation, National Security Branch, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm (last visited
Apr. 16, 2008).
59 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
60 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
6, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2oo6).
62 § 2709(b).
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provision.63 Pursuant to a certification, the FBI has the power to
demand "the name, address, length of service, and local and long
distance toll billing records of a person or entity."64
The certification required under § 2709 must state that the records
sought "are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."65 This
law was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 to remove a
requirement that the FBI limit its requests to information on "foreign
powers" as defined by the FISA.66 Before it was amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709(b)(1)(B) required certification that "there are specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to
whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1801)."67 As it now stands, the
statute allows the FBI to demand disclosure of records pertaining to
purely domestic communications between American citizens.68
An FBI certification may prohibit the telecommunications
provider from whom records are requested from disclosing that a
request for records has been made. 69 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, the
individual making the certification need only state that "there may
result a danger to the national security of the United States,
interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence
investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the
life or physical safety of any person" if the fact that a request for
records was made is revealed to the public.7o If such a statement
accompanies the certification requesting disclosure of records:
63 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Your Local FBI Office,
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
64 18 U.S.C. § 27o9(b).
65 Id.
66 See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505(a)(2).
67 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1)(B) (1994) (amended 2001).
68 § 2709(b)(1).
69 § 2709(C)(1).
7o Id.
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[N]o wire or electronic communications service provider, or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any
person (other than those to whom such disclosure is
necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain
legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request)
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or
obtained access to information or records under this
section.7
Therefore, telephone companies that receive an FBI request for
customer records may be statutorily prohibited from disclosing the
fact of that request. Companies from which the FBI demands phone
records may reveal the demand to their attorneys in order to seek legal
advice, but must inform counsel of the non-disclosure requirement.72
Attorneys who are informed of a request are, in turn, prohibited from
disclosing the fact of that request to any outside party.73 The non-
disclosure provision is not subject to any time limitation.74
As with disclosures of customer records made pursuant to a
warrant, court order, or administrative subpoena, telephone
companies that disclose customer records pursuant to an FBI
certification are granted blanket immunity from both criminal and
civil liability.75 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) specifies that "[n]o cause of action
shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic
communication service . . . for providing information, facilities, or
assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, warrant,
subpoena, statutory authorization, or certification under this
chapter."76 This provision is also contained in Chapter 121 of the
United States Code, the same Chapter that includes 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
71 Id.
72 § 2709(c)(3).
73 Id. Without this statutory provision, attorney-client privilege would prohibit attorneys
from revealing information conveyed by telecommunications clients seeking legal advice.
The statute's main effect is to prohibit attorneys from publicizing the fact that their
telecommunications clients have received an information request from the federal
government even in cases where the client explicitly waives privilege by giving the attorney
permission to publicize the fact that an information request has been made.
74 Id.
75 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (20o6).
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Furthermore, since 18 U.S.C. § 2709 outlines the only procedure in
that Chapter in which a "certification" (as opposed to a warrant, court
order, or administrative subpoena) may be used by a government
agency to request telephone records, the immunity granted by 18
U.S.C. § 2703(e) must apply to FBI certifications. 77 Any other
interpretation of the statute would make the word "certification"
unnecessary.78 Therefore, telecommunications providers are immune
from all potential civil and criminal liability arising out of their
disclosure of customer records pursuant to an FBI certification.
Once customer records are disclosed to the FBI, it may distribute
the records to any other government agency.79 The FBI is allowed to
disseminate records disclosed pursuant to a certification as long as the
distribution is conducted in accordance with guidelines approved by
the Attorney General and "such information is clearly relevant to the
authorized responsibilities of such agency."8 Under this standard, no
check outside of the executive branch limits the distribution of
confidential telephone records between the FBI and other government
agencies. As long as the agency receiving records from the FBI is
involved in combating terrorism, the records collected by the FBI
pursuant to counterterrorism investigations may be disclosed.81
Given reports that recent government requests for disclosure of
telephone company records were made without a warrant or court
order,82 it is likely that the requests were made pursuant to either an
administrative subpoena or an FBI certification. There are three
factors that make it highly likely that the process of FBI certifications
has been used in at least some data mining cases in order to gain
access to telephone customer records: (1) the ease with which an FBI
certification can be made; (2) the fact that the FBI can disseminate
77 See id.
78 See, e.g., Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 467 (1998) ("we are not at liberty to
construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every
word.") (quoting Washington Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, lOl U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879)) (internal
quotations omitted).
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(d) (1994).
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
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records received pursuant to a certification to other agencies engaged
in counterterrorism operation; and (3) the FBI's ability to unilaterally
prohibit telephone companies from revealing the existence of a
records request. In light of the classified nature of the data mining
program, however, it is impossible to know the exact statutory basis
underlying the requests.
C. SUMMARY OF STATUTES REQUIRING DIsCLosuRE
Companies must disclose customer records requested by a
government entity (i) pursuant to a warrant, 83 (2) when served with a
court order,84 (3) when presented with a formal written request for
records relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning
telemarketing fraud, 85 (4) when served with an administrative
subpoena,86 or (5) pursuant to an FBI certification that the records are
relevant to an ongoing counterterrorism investigation. 87 Telephone
companies must retain customer records that have been requested by
a government entity for ninety days pending the issuance of a warrant,
court order, administrative subpoena, or FBI certification. 88 The
government may renew the ninety-day retention period indefinitely.89
Phone companies that disclose customer records pursuant to a
warrant, court order, administrative subpoena, or FBI certification are
granted immunity from both civil and criminal liability.90*
83 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2006).
84 § 2703(c)(1)(B).
85 § 2703(c)(1)(D).
86 § 2703(C)(2).
8718 U.S.C. § 2709 (1994).
88 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (2006).
89 § 2703(0(2).
90 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (2006).
* At the time of writing, there were over 40 civil suits pending against major
telecommunications providers based on the claim that those providers violated customer
privacy protections by disclosing records and allowing government surveillance of
customer conversations. In February, 2008, the United States Senate passed a bill that
would have granted blanket retroactive immunity to telecommunications carriers who
disclosed records or allowed surveillance of customer conversations. However, the House
of Representatives failed to pass a similar version of the bill, thereby preventing it from
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IV. TELEPHONE COMPANY INCENTIVES AND THE DEMISE
OF CUSTOMER PRIVACY
By utilizing a little-known statutory scheme to compel disclosure
of otherwise confidential records, the government's data mining
program creates perverse incentives for telephone companies to
compromise the privacy expectations of their customers. In light of
the general prohibition on disclosure of customer records, the
statutory scheme contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 and 2709 is
troubling.91 The specific nature of the amendments to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709 contained in the USA PATRIOT Act was not widely publicized,
and members of the general public may still be under the impression
that their telephone records cannot be legally revealed to government
agencies.92 Since telephone companies are insulated from all civil and
criminal liability arising out of disclosures, but are not insulated from
government retaliation for failure to comply, they will find it in their
self-interest to cooperate with government requests rather than
protect their customers' privacy. 93 The incentives for cooperation
have been borne out by the fact that only one major telephone
company refused to comply with government requests for records.94
Other companies complied with the program, while simultaneously
stating that they highly valued the privacy of their customers and
would do "everything.. .'within the law"' to protect it.95
becoming law. The issue of retroactive immunity for telecommunications carriers was
reportedly one of the main points of contention that led to the bill's demise. It is unclear
whether Congress will revisit the issue of retroactive immunity in later legislation.
Furthermore, the question of how courts will deal with the statutory immunity granted
under existing law has not yet been resolved. See Senate OKs Immunity for Telecoms in
Intelligence Bill, CNN NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2oo8/POLTICS/02/12/fisa.senate/index.html; House Likely to Let
Surveillance Law Lapse, CNN NEws, Feb. 13, 20o8,
http://www.cnn.com/2oo8/POLITICS/o2/13/fisa.bush/index.html.
91 See 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1999); 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
92 See CBS NEWS, supra note 2 (quoting various Congressional representatives regarding
the "privacy crisis" created by the data mining program).
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (2oo6).
94 CBS NEWS, supra note 2 (noting that "the only telecom giant to refuse the government's
request was Qwest, which serves 14 million customers in the West and Northwest").
95 Id.; see also Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at A; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al.
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The overwhelming incentive for telephone companies to cooperate
with government requests for records is especially troubling when
examined in light of the fact that telephone companies may be
forbidden by the terms of an administrative subpoena or FBI
certification from revealing that such a request has been made.96
Since government agencies need not inform telephone customers that
their records have been requested, 97 it is highly unlikely that an
individual whose records were disclosed would ever learn of the
disclosure. The virtual impossibility of any given individual
ascertaining whether his or her records were disclosed to the
government creates a collective action problem due to the fact that it
will be difficult to mobilize public opinion to advocate for the privacy
of records when the particular victims of the program cannot be
identified. The government can, in essence, characterize the program
as being limited to "terrorists" or some form of sociological "other"
and thereby claim that "ordinary Americans" are unaffected. When
attempting to justify the data mining program shortly after media
reports about it emerged, the government did just that.98
V. DATA MINING AS AN INEFFICIENT USE
OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES
More troubling than the data mining program's implications for
privacy rights is the fact that it is an extremely inefficient method of
investigating possible terrorist activity. Media reports cite multiple
sources within the counterterrorism community who complain that
the data mining program wastes the limited time and resources of
government investigators by creating millions of false positive suspect
identifications that then must be eliminated through more traditional
investigatory methods.99 The New York Times reported that the NSA
referred such a large number of suspects to the FBI for investigation
that "hundreds of agents" had to be diverted in an effort "to check out
thousands of tips a month."100 According to FBI agents, the large
96See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(3) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3) (2006).
98 See, e.g., Lichtblau and Risen, supra note 1, at Al; Bergman et al., supra note 2, at A1;
CBS NEWS, supra note 2; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 4.
99 See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al; CBS NEWS, supra note 2.
100 Bergman et al., supra note 2, at Al.
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amount of tips received from the data mining program led to few
potential terrorists who had not been discovered by using more
traditional investigative tactics, and "diverted agents from
counterterrorism work they viewed as more productive."lol It is
impossible, in light of the dual constraints of budgetary resources and
limited personnel, for the government to investigate every potential
lead regardless of the degree of likelihood that it may result in the
detection of a terrorist plot. Therefore, government agents and
resources should be allocated to the most promising leads-the ones
most likely to preempt an attack-in order to save the maximum
amount of American lives.
VI. CONCLUSION: TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
Traditional investigative tools that rely on particularized
suspicion, as opposed to a wide dragnet of communications records
and other data, present a more effective and more efficient means of
investigating potential terrorists. Under a more traditional
investigative model, raw data is narrowed by the requirement that
investigators meet some threshold of suspicion before gaining access
to confidential information concerning a suspect. 10 2 In the case of
counterterrorism, the requirement that some threshold of suspicion
be established before an individual is considered a suspect would
narrow the focus of government agents and assure that limited
government resources are used to investigate those individuals who
are most likely to pose a threat. In short, it would force the
government to conserve resources by prioritizing their suspects.
Such prioritization is desirable for a number of reasons. As
mentioned above, the resources devoted to combating terrorism are,
while considerable, necessarily finite. If hundreds of government
agents find their time monopolized by the requirement that they sift
through mountains of raw data and eliminate thousands of suspects
with no apparent ties to international terrorism other than anomalous
patterns in their telephone records, those agents are not spending
their time investigating individuals who have been identified as
101 Id.
202 The probable cause requirement of U.S. CONST. amend. IV, and reasonable suspicion
requirement of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), serve as examples of the different
thresholds of suspicion required for varying levels of intrusion by government agents.
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potential terrorists by informants or other traditional law enforcement
methods.
A second benefit of prioritizing terrorism suspects by utilizing
traditional law enforcement methods is presented by the ongoing
nature and potential long-term benefits of those investigatory
techniques. Data mining generates information on the telephone
communication patterns of a single individual. That information is
only useful in investigating the individual to whom it applies. In
contrast, traditional law enforcement methods such as cultivating
informants within terrorist organizations, mapping the movement of
suspects through first-hand surveillance, and interrogating suspects in
order to "flip" them and force them to turn over their colleagues, have
collateral benefits beyond the original investigation. Informants can
be utilized in the future. Once an organization's safe houses and
preferred methods of travel are discovered, those areas and
transportation routes can be monitored for future activity. When an
individual being interrogated informs police as to the identity of his
co-conspirators, those identities can be used to generate future
investigations and arrests, or to create future informants by
pressuring individuals with the threat of legal action and punishment.
Finally, a prioritization of terrorism suspects by requiring some
threshold of suspicion before an investigation of an individual
proceeds has the added benefit of assuring the privacy of those whom
authorities have no reason to believe are involved in terrorism. That
benefit, which is traditionally protected by the requirement that law
enforcement show "probable cause" before searching or seizing an
individual, is compromised by data mining and other programs which
depend on confidential bits of information innocent in and of
themselves, that are compiled and used to detect suspicious patterns
of behavior.
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